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Abstract
The technologies that now dominate the production of goods and services, especially in advanced
industrialized countries, have irrevocably changed the dynamics of the demand for and return to labor.
Employment in technology-intensive occupations such as computer programming and network technology
has increased at double the rate of US non-farm employment overall since the mid-1990s (US Department of
Commerce, 2000), and thousands of other jobs in offices, factories and retail establishments demand
technological infrastructures unneeded ten years ago. The ability to manipulate information, and to service
and maintain the delivery systems by which information travels among users, has become increasingly linked
to earning power. This is particularly true in cities. According to Rondinelli et al., the basis of urban economic
development is now 'a technology- and knowledge-based system of production and services' (1998: 83) and
those without the skills to participate in this system are confined to secondary, futureless roles in urban
economies.
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Information Technology and Urban Labor
Markets in the United States
LAURA WOLF-POWERS
Introduction
The technologies that now dominate the production of goods and services, especially in
advanced industrialized countries, have irrevocably changed the dynamics of the demand
for and return to labor. Employment in technology-intensive occupations such as
computer programming and network technology has increased at double the rate of US
non-farm employment overall since the mid-1990s (US Department of Commerce, 2000),
and thousands of other jobs in offices, factories and retail establishments demand
technological infrastructures unneeded ten years ago. The ability to manipulate
information, and to service and maintain the delivery systems by which information
travels among users, has become increasingly linked to earning power. This is particularly
true in cities. According to Rondinelli et al., the basis of urban economic development is
now ‘a technology- and knowledge-based system of production and services’ (1998: 83)
and those without the skills to participate in this system are confined to secondary,
futureless roles in urban economies.
Information technology has had a major impact on the geography of work, the
competition among places (Moss, 1987; Brotchie et al., 1995; Massey, 1995; Atkinson,
1998; Graham, this issue),1 and the characteristics of urban labor markets. This article
focuses on the skill dimension of IT’s impact on urban labor markets, exploring the
implications of a ‘technology and knowledge-based system of production and services’
for the prospects, not of places, but of the people who work in them. In doing so, it dwells
primarily on the US context, where people-oriented policies, particularly education and
workforce development, have assumed a newly prominent role in public and academic
conversations about urban vitality. In advanced urban economies, scholars and policy-
makers argue, measures conventionally pursued to attract firms — tax incentives, urban
infrastructure, mega-projects focused on drawing tourists or convention-goers — are
increasingly less effective, because human capital, not physical capital, has become the
twenty-first century’s key competitive advantage (Clarke and Gaile, 1998; Rondinelli et
 Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001. Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
1 Different cities play different roles in the spatial division of labor which information technology has
helped to bring about: some are command posts specializing in high-end export services; some are new
high-tech research centers in formerly ‘second-tier’ US cities like Austin, Texas; and some are new growth
poles abroad such as Andra Pradesh in India (Markusen et al., 1999; Eischen, 2000; Oden and Larsen,
2000). Rampant job growth in and migration to lower-order ‘service export’ enclaves from Jacksonville,
Florida, to Dublin, Ireland, to Bali, Indonesia, suggest that a city can specialize in in-bound telemarketing
or software code-writing the way it might once have specialized in steel or textiles (Arnold, 2000; Cowell,
2000; Uchitelle, 2000). This switch from industrial to functional specialization has had a major impact on
opportunities for workers.
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al., 1998; Mathur, 1999; Weinstein and Clower, 2000). Thus, policies to attract desirable
workers, in addition to policies aimed at increasing the skill level of the existing
workforce, have gained priority among economic development planners. Traditional
distinctions between ‘people policy’ and ‘place policy’ at the state and local level can be
said to have collapsed. Although applicable to all cities where information technologies
permeate workplaces, a discussion of workforce development policy as an urban policy is
particularly relevant to the United States, where local officials bear responsibility for
education and workforce preparation in ways that their counterparts in other countries do
not. After reviewing the literature on technology’s impact on the demand for and returns
to work in US cities, this article examines different types of local policies designed to
attract, retain and develop labor assets and discusses the advantages and limitations of
these policies. Even though the IT revolution has strengthened the link between labor
assets and place vitality, I argue that researchers should be skeptical that local labor and
human capital strategies have wholly transfigured place policy in the US economy, or that
they have the capacity to do so. Reasons for this skepticism include the vibrancy of
international markets for skilled labor, a fragmented US workforce development system,
and the simple fact that, in the absence of institutional change, the majority of new jobs
created in the ‘knowledge economy’ will continue to be low-status and low-paid.
Skill and the city
An exploration of IT’s impact on the demand for skill must begin with an analysis of
secular economic trends. Since the early 1980s, growth in the US economy has been
powered by the domestic sale and export of IT-related hardware and software, by
domestic sale and export production of information ‘content’ such as entertainment, and
by domestic sale and export of advanced services (legal, financial, consulting) in which
information technology is a key input. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Internet applications
and content became additional growth drivers. Advanced services, entertainment and
Internet content, in particular, are urban-based industries, employing thousands of
creative, ambitious people in the cores of major US cities, some of which have captured
considerably more activity than others. Such indicators as the registration of dot-com
domain names and rental rates for downtown commercial space suggest that new media
and e-commerce jobs have concentrated industrial district-style in the central cities of
first-tier commercial entrepôts (Moss and Townsend, 1997; Crains New York Business,
2000; Kellerman, 2000; Zook, 2000a) and to some extent in fast-growing so-called
‘second-tier cities’ such as Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, and Austin, Texas.2 Reasons
for the clustering likely include what scholars have called ‘innovative milieus’ (Storper
and Scott, 1992; Storper, 1997): proximity to film, arts and theater enterprises; the
preference of creative young employees for city living; the key role played by informal
social contact; and proximity to venture capital firms (Zook, 2000b). Despite some signs
of dispersal, urban IT clusters, particularly agglomerations of firms producing creative
material, mark a trend toward the spatial reconcentration of job opportunities in the urban
core.
2 The core cities of New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco have more commercial Internet domain
names registered in them than the next twelve most domain name-populous cities combined (Zook,
2000a), and while domain name registration does not correspond one-to-one with business activity, the
ascendancy of ‘Multimedia Gulch’ in San Francisco, ‘Silicon Alley’ in New York and ‘Hollywood.com’
in the Hollywood and Santa Monica districts of Los Angeles County strongly suggest that Internet content
production and e-commerce are city-center phenomena. Thus, while much IT ‘talent’ works in office
parks in the edge cities of second-tier metropolitan areas, there appear to be some segments of the sector
whose labor pool thrives not simply in urban areas but specifically in the dense, capital-rich atmospheres
of older central business districts.
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What sort of job opportunities these are, however, is another matter. Demand for
labor in the US economy has been skewed toward the top and bottom extremes of the
wage/skill spectrum for the last decade (Appelbaum and Albin, 1990; McDonald and
Sirianni, 1996; Howell, 1999), especially within cities (Sassen, 1991; Fainstein et al.,
1992; Sassen, 1998). In part, this reflects declining labor demand in old-line, unionized
urban manufacturing, where many workers commanded middle-class wages in the
postwar period.3 It also stems, however, from technology-induced labor-market
segmentation in conventionally urban-based service industries such as banking, insurance
and telecommunications. In banking and insurance, executives, adopting computer-based
technology, have hired more managers, upgraded some routine clerical jobs into more
autonomous semi-professional or technical positions and downgraded many formerly
mid-level clerical positions into low-paying service jobs (Baran, 1985; Pollard, 1995). In
telecommunications the pattern is slightly different, with increased skill and autonomy
demanded on the technical (infrastructure maintenance and installation) side of the
business and skilled clerical and customer-service jobs converted into low-paid, low-
status positions with the advent of such technologies as voice recognition software (Keefe
and Batt, 1997; Batt and Strausser, 1998).4 In all these sectors, and in the labor market
generally, the elimination of positions in the middle of the job ladder has increased
within-industry wage dispersion and limited opportunities for mobility (Noyelle, 1987;
Cappelli et al., 1997; Herzenberg et al., 1998). In addition to technology-driven
polarization in white-collar industries, Sassen argues, researchers should consider as part
of the same phenomenon the profusion of low-paid urban retail and service workers who
maintain the living and working environments of the highly paid urban elite (see also
Piore, 1980). Many of these workers are immigrants: affluent New Yorkers, for example,
get inexpensive manicures and facials from first generation Asians and eastern
Europeans, have their offices vacuumed by Poles and hire Caribbean-born nannies to
care for their children.
The IT workforce itself (workers in IT-producing sectors and workers in IT
occupations in other industries) also exhibits tendencies toward segmentation. Demand
for IT workers overall has greatly increased with the penetration of computer networks,
the Internet and other digitized products into workplaces and homes. Workers in IT
occupations totaled 7.4 million, or 6.1% of all US workers, in 1998, their numbers having
grown by 28% since 1994 (US Department of Commerce, 2000). There is a gap, however,
between employers’ demand for high-skilled, high-paid employees such as systems
analysts, computer programmers and copy writers and their demand for lower-status IT
workers such as computer operators. This demand gap is reflected in earnings disparities,
which vary from city to city depending on labor supply and the segment of IT production
in which a given metropolitan area specializes. Much-publicized labor shortages at the
higher-skilled end of the IT spectrum have had employers petitioning Congress to allow
further immigration of technical workers from other countries, a subject that will be dealt
with later in this essay. The main point here is that within IT itself, polarized labor
3 While manufacturing has certainly shed workers, the shrinking manufacturing sector may be in part
an artifact of classification patterns. According to Current Population Survey data, close to a third of
temporary employees work in manufacturing, but because their employer is a labor broker or
temporary help supply agency, they are counted as service-sector workers (Cohany, 1996). Workers
who are employed in manufacturing and warehousing jobs via temporary help firms are at the low
end of the earnings distribution (see Peck and Theodore, 1998). It seems clear that low-paid, labor-
intensive manufacturing continues to be a source of employment for many in the United States, even
if workers’ presence remains hidden because of sectoral classification issues or as a result of their
undocumented immigrant status. In these cases, however, a manufacturing job does not lead to
middle-income status.
4 Telecommunications customer service is also less and less of an urban-core-based activity, as companies
have discovered the cost savings realizable by moving call-center facilities to the peripheries of urban
areas.
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markets are quite pronounced. In contrast to vertically integrated goods and services
industries of the past, the industry is fragmented. Training programs provided by
employers and internal labor markets that formerly provided bridges between entry-level
positions and higher-paying jobs no longer exist. Individuals who are not ‘plugged in’ to
informal social networks and occupational communities have difficulty building careers
(see Benner, 2000). The changes wrought over time by these forces in a single
metropolitan labor market — New York’s — are shown in Table 1, compiled by Gester
(2000) using a classification scheme developed by Gittleman and Howell (1995).5 So-
called Independent Primary occupations — relatively high-paid professional jobs for
which specific vocational preparation is required — increased their share of total jobs in
the region by over 10% between 1979 and 1997. In Subordinate Primary occupations,
which include well paid blue-collar jobs and moderately well paid sales and clerical
positions, employment share declined by over 10% as well as decreasing in absolute
terms. About the same proportion of New Yorkers worked in Secondary occupations
(which include lower wage blue-collar jobs and jobs in retail, building maintenance,
childcare and other labor-intensive services) in 1997 as in 1979. Another recent study,
focusing on the five boroughs, found an even more pronounced hourglass shape, with job
growth at both the top and the bottom of the income distribution and decline in the
middle, along with a widening earnings gap between rich and poor (Greenhouse, 2000).6
In the urban milieu, technology appears to be exacerbating labor segmentation, increasing
demand both for professional and for low-status service and production workers. As
Sassen observes, however, ‘the labor markets associated with a given set of technologies
can, in principle, vary considerably and contain distinct mobility paths for workers’
(1998: 142). Technology has not autonomously created labor market dualism; rather, it
has been a resource and decision factor for corporate managers operating in specific
5 Gittleman and Howell (1995) conducted a cluster analysis of 621 potential jobs (defined by occupation
and industry — craft production workers in the aerospace industry, e.g.) that resulted in three ‘segments’
— Independent Primary, Subordinate Primary and Secondary — and within each segment, two more fine-
grained ‘contours’. Segments are used here; the jobs within each one are distinct from each other in terms
of earnings and benefits, skill requirements, working conditions, employment status and institutional
setting. This schema enables a much more accurate assessment than industry or occupational analysis by
itself, since it permits the researcher to identify the interactions between industrial and occupational
restructuring and their ramifications for particular social groups.
6 This was a report released on 2 October by the Working Group on the New York City Low Wage Labor
Market, a task force of economists who contended that: ‘Despite the strong pace of private-sector job
growth, an alarming number of families in New York City are unable to earn enough to achieve an
acceptable standard of living’. According to the report, workers in New York who earn more than $75,000
posted an average wage increase of 65% from 1989 to 1999, while the wages of those earning less than
$25,000 dropped 2.2%.
Table 1 New York Metropolitan Area* employment 1979–97, by job quality segment
Total Employment Independent Primary Subordinate Primary Secondary
(in thousands) (%) (%) (%)
1979 1989 1997 1979 1989 1997 1979 1989 1997 1979 1989 1997
3,890 4,810 5,130 28.8 39.5 39.2 35.0 28.3 24.2 36.5 32.2 36.6
* New York, NY PMSA (5 boroughs), Bergan-Passaic, NJ PMSA, Newark, NJ PMSA, Nassau-Suffolkm NY
PMSA, Jersey City, NJ PMSA.
Source: Compliled by Kimberly Gester from PUMS 1980, PUMS 1990 and 1997–98 Current Population
Survey merged outgoing rotation groups data, using job classification developed by Gittleman and Howell
(1995).
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social and political contexts.7 In the US, this is a context in which legislators have
authorized the deregulation of major industries, in which employers increasingly pursue
outsourcing and casualized labor arrangements as a way of cutting costs, and in which
organized labor’s ability to represent workers effectively has weakened.8 The growth,
respectively, of high-paying cognitive jobs and low-wage, dead-end jobs is not the
inevitable outcome of technological change: it is one possibility among many.
The policy response
As knowledge-intensive goods production, information-rich transactions and information
itself come to form the backbone of the US economy, urban competitiveness appears to rest
on the ability to maintain labor advantages — either labor advantages that harmonize with
cost advantages (this would be the case in a city like Jacksonville, Florida, where land and
housing are inexpensive and salaries and wages relatively low, even for skilled workers) or
labor advantages that are so great as to offset high costs (as would be the case in New York
or San Francisco). Consequently, economic development officials are turning their attention
to labor and workforce development policy with more interest than in the past. Rankings of
cities by publications such as Fortune and Sprint Business increasingly use workforce
educational attainment as a ranking criterion for urban competitiveness, or indirectly deal
with workforce issues by examining cities’ potential to attract and hold skilled managers and
professionals (see Weinstein and Clower, 2000). Clarke and Gaile claim ‘a new urban
hierarchy . . . based on the geography of human capital’ (1998: 199) and argue that local
policy initiatives must center on developing human capital resources. Municipal and county
economic development policy takes a variety of paths toward this goal. The first is akin to
conventional business attraction policy, and operates on the assumption that labor, like
capital, is mobile and can be coaxed into migrating — not by greenfield sites and airports,
but by safe neighborhoods, good schools or downtowns. Whatever form these quality of life
improvements take, officials who facilitate them capture people who create value in a local
economy. It is not entirely clear whether this set of policies is aimed directly at workers or
indirectly at companies; a long-running debate in regional economics centers on the question
of whether growth in employment opportunity lags behind population growth or the other
way around (see Clark, 1983).9 At any rate, measures of this sort can be seen as smokestack-
chasing in a different guise, with workers, rather than factories, as the prize. While
incumbent residents benefit from amenities improvements, this approach, with the
significant exception of public school reforms, does nothing to improve the labor market
prospects of the poor and low-skilled, and the effect of public school improvement may be
muted by metropolitan residential segregation.10 In fact, just as local development policy
may be designed to attract skilled people, it may be fashioned to repel residents who are not
considered valuable to a region’s human capital profile.
7 Appelbaum and Albin note, for example, that alternative ways of organizing work and employee training
in the insurance industry could lead to a larger number of ‘multi-activity, integrated and responsible jobs’
(1989: 264).
8 As Moss remarks in an article about the introduction of alternative methods of waste water management in
Berlin: ‘Large technological systems, such as electricity or telecommunications networks, cannot be
understood solely in terms of their technological components but as complex systems which link material
technologies with organizations, institutional rules, and cultural values’ (2000: 65).
9 The importance of defense firms’ location in non-traditional industrial spaces, for example, was a factor in
the population resettlement, and particularly the migration of scientists and engineers, from the Northeast
and Midwest to the South and West during the second world war and the cold war (Markusen et al., 1991;
Campbell, 1993).
10 Part of the dilemma here is that most metropolitan areas are balkanized into rich and poor communities,
with little economic redistribution of wealth or opportunity among them, even in good economic times
(see Hill and Wolman, 1997).
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A second strategy involves a labor-oriented approach to nurturing and growing
vibrant industry sectors. This is a people-centered twist on the sector or cluster strategy
under which local officials use regional economic analysis to identify dynamic clusters of
firms and then target those clusters for investment and other assistance (see Bacheller,
2000). Because production processes in information-intensive industries tend to be
project-based rather than firm-based, and because labor is so key to these processes
(Christopherson, 2000), the logic is that a crucial part of any sectoral development
strategy is a focus on the needs and behavior of that sector’s workforce. Rather than
aiming to attract skilled workers from other places, policy-makers using this approach
develop strategies to address the needs of key professionals already working in their
cities. A recent study of new media workers in New York City, for example, concludes
that these employees’ lives, and consequently the competitiveness of their sector, would
be enhanced by training opportunities, stronger professional associations, and extra-firm
structures for health insurance and other benefits — all things that could be influenced by
city and regional policies (Batt et al., 2001). A variation on this approach is recommended
by Markusen (2000), who argues that officials can develop competitive advantages by
targeting occupations rather than industries for policy assistance. The idea is to create or
enhance existing milieus of innovation, inducing talented people to develop attachments
to places.
A third approach goes directly to the development of human capital, which,
according to economic theory and an increasing amount of policy rhetoric, suffers from
underinvestment (see Clarke and Gaile, 1998; Mathur, 1999). Here the logic is that with
the shrewd employment of resources in the K-12 and community college systems, along
with federal employment and training dollars (recently consolidated in the Workforce
Investment Act of 1998), local officials can develop human capital in place, wedding the
goals of economic competitiveness and poverty reduction. Place-based efforts to develop
human capital for the information economy can both address the needs of marginalized
groups and promote economic growth. Such efforts include partnerships between
community colleges and employers (Fitzgerald, 1998), sectoral training initiatives
involving labor unions and/or community-based organizations (Parker and Rogers, 2000),
efforts to build career paths for disadvantaged workers in the highly fragmented IT sector
(Alssid, 2000; Chapple and Zook, 2000), and the Community Technology Centers
mentioned by Servon and Nelson in this issue. With unemployment low, employers’
interest in productive workers seems to be coinciding with the objectives of local
governments that want to link central city residents with living-wage jobs. For policy-
makers, the chance to focus on education and training, particularly training connected
with the fostering of networks and job ladders, creates an opening for equity planning in
the knowledge economy.
Challenges
But while the project of building local human-capital resources to revive cities and offer
opportunity to the disadvantaged may be possible in the good times, researchers and
policy-makers are in error if they view it as an uncomplicated harmonizing of
‘competitiveness’ policy with anti-poverty efforts. The human capital strategy, like any
strategy pursued in a political environment, is fraught with contradictions. Several
barriers are particularly significant. First, while IT advances have made labor more
important to local economic development, they have also helped create national and
international markets for specialized workers that may deter employers from developing
local talent. As Sassen points out, a system to permit the ‘circulation’ of skilled
executives and advanced service workers has emerged, and it is completely detached
from conventional immigration policy (1998: 15). The H1-B Visas issued to high-skilled
 Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
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workers from other countries are non-immigrant visas, and there has been enormous
industry pressure on Congress to increase the annual cap on the number issued.11 The H1-
B program is criticized on many grounds, including its argued effect of draining
productive workers from other economies, but one of its major domestic effects is to
reduce the sense of urgency about building human capital in place.12
A second barrier to human capital development strategies in the knowledge economy
is the fragmented nature of federal, state and local funding for education and job training,
as well as the extreme paucity of such funding. Government leaders in the US,
aggressively informed by a market ideology, have always been loath to link labor-market
policy to economic policy at the national level, and in the instance of job training, the
tendency to minimally fund a plethora of discrete and disconnected local initiatives rather
than planning comprehensively is especially evident (see Weir, 1992; Mueller and
Schwartz, 1988). The Workforce Investment Act (WIA), passed by Congress in 1998, is
intended to resolve some of these problems, but even under WIA, federal and state
funding streams, regulations and performance standards for various employment-related
efforts remain separate, making local program integration a challenge (Teegarden and
Baran, 2000). An understanding of the connection between workforce development and
long-term growth has spurred elected officials in some places, such as Seattle and San
Francisco, to design region-wide workforce development systems that bring multiple
institutions together, combine training with human services and economic development,
and engage the involvement and energy of employers (Alssid, 2000; Fitzgerald, 2000).
Isolated instances of workforce development for poverty reduction are overshadowed,
however, by the pursuit, in the wake of 1996’s welfare reform law, of a ‘Work First’
approach, which focuses single-mindedly — and in many cases punitively — on
reducing welfare rolls by moving people into jobs, regardless of the quality of those jobs
and regardless of the opportunities they might provide for escaping poverty. Connected
with the ‘Work First’ dilemma is the fact that low-wage jobs greatly exceed high-wage
jobs in the information economy. A focus on skill development as the primary policy
strategy in the current climate implies a belief that human capital deficiencies at the low
end of the labor market — combined with an IT-induced growth in demand for skill at
that same end of the market — are responsible for the growth in wage inequality in the
US over the last two decades. In other words, workers at the bottom are doing poorly
because there has been a shift in demand, driven by computerization, that favors high-
skilled over low-skilled workers. But, as Howell (1999) argues, empirical evidence for the
‘skill-biased technical change’ argument is weak. Low-skilled work has been increasing
at the same or greater rate than high-skilled work — as shown above, it is jobs that place
people in the middle of the income distribution that have become more scarce, and the
reasons for this are institutional as well as technological. Changes in skill requirements
are not the only driver of social inequality in the US economy, so human capital strategies
on their own will not reduce poverty. Better primary education, more effective transitions
from school to work, and retraining for people with obsolete skills are essential. But also
needed are institutional and political strategies that increase the return to work that is
currently low wage and change the institutional bargain between employers, workers and
government in ways that favor low-wage workers.
11 A law signed by President Clinton in October 2000 increased the number of H-1B visas to 195,000 for
each of the next three years, starting with the fiscal year that began 1 October. The previous cap had been
107,500 for that fiscal year and 65,000 in subsequent years.
12 The federal government is addressing this issue somewhat: fees from H-1B Visas, which have recently
increased from $500 to $1,000, are used by the Department of Labor to fund training in high-tech
occupations for displaced and disadvantaged workers.
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Conclusion
With business investment in information-processing equipment and software accounting
for nearly a fifth of GDP growth in recent quarters (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2001),
information-intensive industries and occupations promise to persist as forces shaping the
nature of work and economic opportunity in the United States. The morphology of cities
and the size of commuter sheds will continue to shift in response to the requirements of
emerging IT industries. Some IT firms will continue clustering in center-city industrial
districts while others, as the product cycle progresses, will disperse into the hinterlands or
relocate to lower cost places around the world. Technology will also continue to change
the nature of jobs and skill requirements.
In this context, the impact of the human capital policies now being enthusiastically
touted in US cities — particularly those targeted at the disadvantaged — will depend on
many factors. One such factor is the ability of local officials to simplify the workforce
development system at the local level, synthesizing diverse funding streams, connecting
programs previously operating in isolation from one another and focusing not simply on
job placement, but on career mobility for clients. Another factor is the future
performance of the US economy, which is in some doubt as of this writing. In a time of
slack labor demand, employers may lose interest in working with city and non-profit
programs. Yet another factor is the ability of competing places — from Tampa, Florida,
to Andra Pradesh, India — to attract and develop labor assets in ways that change firms’
locational calculations and disrupt in-place workforce development efforts before they
have had a chance to succeed. Finally, the backdrop created by state and national
governments will be crucial to the success of cities’ efforts. Support extended to or
withdrawn from training organizations and public universities, the impulse to solve labor
shortages by granting H1-B Visas or by financing domestic high-tech training, the legal
and regulatory parameters surrounding employee participation and collective bargaining
— all of these variables converge to form the stage on which local human capital
policies are attempted.
Laura Wolf-Powers (annalaur@eden.rutgers.edu), Department of Urban Planning and
Policy Development, Rutgers University, 33 Livingston Ave., 3rd Floor, New Brunswick,
NJ 08901, USA.
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